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Abstract
We experimentally investigate if subjects in a tacit coordination
situation with a conflict of interest tend to choose an equal compro-
mise, even if it is strictly dominated. The data show that this is the
case, as long as the compromise payoffs are not too low. Game com-
parisons suggest that choosing a dominated compromise is a focal
point that allows subjects to avoid a costly coordination failure.
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Many important strategic situations are characterized by a conflict of in-
terest, and by a variety of ways in which a costly conflict can be avoided. If
the decision makers cannot communicate before or while they make their
decisions, then they need to tacitly coordinate their beliefs and actions.
An important theoretical and empirical question (see for example Blume
and Gneezy (2010), Crawford et al. (2008), Holm (2000), Isoni et al. (2013),
Mehta et al. (1994a), Mehta et al. (1994b), and Schelling (1960)) is if the de-
cision makers will manage to identify a focal point that helps them to avoid
a costly failure to coordinate.
In this paper we consider tacit coordination situations where there is an
outcome that gives equal and strictly positive earnings, and it is an equi-
librium – but it is strictly dominated by one or several efficient equilibria
offering unequal earnings. We ask: Is the equal dominated equilibrium
focal?
To the best of our knowledge the existing literature has, with very
few exceptions that we describe below, only considered tacit coordina-
tion and bargaining situations with equal and efficient earnings outcomes.
See for example Holm (2000), Mehta et al. (1992), Nydegger and Owen
(1975), Roth and Malouf (1979), Roth and Murnighan (1982), Roth (1995),
Schelling (1960), van Huyck et al. (1992), and van Huyck et al. (1995).
We collect data for two types of coordination games. In a Three-Allocation
Game there are, in addition to the equal and dominated equilibrium, two
efficient unequal earnings equilibria. A Two-Allocation Game has the
same equal and dominated equilibrium, but only a single efficient unequal
earnings equilibrium. In the first game there is therefore a coordination
problem in selecting among efficient equilibria (similar to that in a battle
of the sexes game), but not in the second game. This implies that in the
Three-Allocation Game the equal and dominated equilibrium can (if its
payoffs are not too low) serve as a compromise that permits players to avoid
a coordination failure in selecting an efficient equilibrium, while in the
Two-Allocation Game the equal outcome plays no such role, since there is,
by design, no coordination problem in selecting an efficient equilibrium.
Thus we might expect less play of the dominated equal equilibrium in the
Two than in the Three-Allocation game.
We observe in the Three-Allocation Game that the equal and domi-
nated outcome remains strongly salient, as long it does not offer payoffs
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that are very low. Moreover, its salience decreases only gradually as its
payoffs decrease. In the Two-Allocation Game, on the other hand, the
dominated equal earnings equilibrium is significantly less salient. These
findings suggest that in tacitly played coordination situations where there
are several efficient equilibria each preferred by a different player, an equal
but dominated outcome is, as long its payoffs are not too low, a strong fo-
cal point primarily because it offers players a way to avoid the strategic
uncertainty due to the multiplicity of efficient equilibria, and hence the in-
creased risk of coordination failure (Crawford (1990), Janssen (2006), and
Schelling (1960)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe
some related literature. Section 3 describes the coordination games, and
gives some applications. Sections 4 and 5 outline the experimental logis-
tics and treatments. The data are described in Section 6. We consider the
explanatory power of three theoretical approaches, focal point based rea-
soning, level-k modelling, and social preferences based on inequity aver-
sion, in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Crawford et al. (2008) (from here on abbreviated as CGR) collect data for
‘Pie’ games, where an equal earnings allocation is weakly (but not strictly)
Pareto dominated.1 CGR observe that most subjects choose the equal al-
location. In their design the equal allocation was, however, also salient by
virtue of being visually distinct from the other allocations2, so it is not clear
to what extent the observed behavior is driven by the salience of payoff
equality or by the visual representation of the game. One of our findings,
that weakly dominated equality is as salient as efficient equality in a more
neutral frame, thus complements and strengthens their results. Also, we
extend the investigation to the case where the equal earnings outcome is
1In one of their games the money allocations are ($5,$5), ($5,$6), and ($6,$5); another
game offers ($5,$5), ($5,$10), and ($10,$5). CGR also collect data from ‘XY’ games, but
these are two-times-two games with no equal earnings compromise outcome, except the
degenerate one giving zero to each player.
2In CGR’s representation, players coordinated by choosing the same ‘slice’ from a
‘pie’, and the equal allocation slice had a different color than the other slices.
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strictly dominated by other outcomes.3
Isoni et al. (2013) study bargaining games where an equal surplus di-
vision can be dominated (however they only consider weak, not strict,
domination). They observe that very few subjects coordinate on such a
division. This finding is different from ours. It is not straightforward to
explain why the results differ, due to the different frames (coordination
versus bargaining), but one reason can be that in their set-up there are
several surplus divisions that equate earnings, so players not only face a
coordination problem regarding the selection of an unequal and efficient
allocation, but also with respect to an equal and dominated division. In
our coordination frame, there is a unique outcome that offers strictly posi-
tive and equal earnings, so there is only a coordination problem regarding
which efficient and unequal earnings equilibrium to coordinate on.
There are also some studies that experimentally examine the salience of
dominated equitable outcomes in a cooperative bargaining setup, where
subjects can make binding agreements. See Galeotti et al. (2015), Herreiner
and Puppe (2010), and Isoni et al. (2014). Finally, it is relevant to draw
the reader’s attention to dictator game experiments that investigate how
individuals trade off equality and efficiency – see Kritikos and Bolle (2001)
and Engelmann and Strobel (2004).
3 The Coordination Games
3.1 Three-Allocation Games
In the Three-Allocation Game Player 1 and 2 separately, simultaneously,
and without pre-play communication choose one of three feasible money
allocations (in British Pounds, £):
• £X for Player 1 and £X for Player 2
3A recent working paper, Faillo et al. (2015), consider coordination under different
payoff structures and one of their games has payoffs that are qualitatively similar to some
of our three allocation games (although their frame differs). Faillo et al are primarily
occupied with testing team versus level-k reasoning across a variety of different games.
Moreover, the authors do not make the same game comparisons between two and three
allocation games that take centre stage in our paper, and that allow us to assess the extent
to which dominated equality is salient because it acts as a compromise between unequal
outcomes.
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• £6 for Player 1 and £7 for Player 2
• £7 for Player 1 and £6 for Player 2.
We refer to these allocations as (X, X), (6,7), and (7,6). If the players
choose the same allocation, then the allocation is paid out. If the play-
ers choose different allocations, neither player receives any money.4 We
assume throughout this section that players are self-interested.
If we for simplicity denote the strategy of choosing the first (second)
[third] of these money allocations as A, B, and C, respectively, then this
game can be represented as a game in strategic form, with the payoff ma-
trix shown in Table 1, where Player 1 (2) is the Row (Column) player.
A B C
A X, X 0,0 0,0
B 0,0 6,7 0,0
C 0,0 0,0 7,6
Table 1: Strategic form of the Three-Allocation Game
We can think of this game as representing, in an admittedly highly simpli-
fied form, a real world coordination situation where two decision makers
need to agree on an allocation of money (or more generally a joint course
of action, possibly involving several production and transfer divisions),
chosen from a menu of three possible allocations. They earn money if and
only if they select the same option. An agreement on B or C imply unequal
earnings (B is preferred by Player 2, and C is preferred by 1), while equal
earnings can be obtained by agreeing on outcome A. We refer to A as the
‘compromise’. If X ≤ 6, the compromise outcome is dominated.
4Our game can be interpreted as a ’mini Nash demand game’ (Nash (1953)). Similar
games are studied in van Huyck et al. (1992) and van Huyck et al. (1995), but, crucially,
in those studies the equal outcome is efficient.
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Two Applications The research presented in this paper could be applied
to a number of settings. Suppose, for example, that two siblings inherit
two paintings. Each sibling prefers the same painting. However, they are
liquidity constrained, so the sibling that gets the preferred painting can-
not compensate the sibling that gets the other painting. They may agree to
get one painting each (cf. outcomes B or C in the game), or they may sell
them and divide the proceeds equally (outcome A). Depending on how
marketable the paintings are, the proceeds from the sale may be quite low,
and so outcome A may be dominated by B and C, where payoffs are un-
equal. As another application, consider a couple who must agree on how
each should allocate their time between earning money and doing house-
hold work. Suppose both prefer one of these activities over the other (this
could be due to each having a comparative advantage in the same activ-
ity). They can agree that they should both have jobs and share household
work (Option A), or that one of them should spend most of his or her
time earning money and the other should be at home; if some transfers of
money take place afterwards, this can give rise to outcomes such as B or C
that dominate (A,A).
Assume 0 < X < 7. Any outcome where both players choose the
same allocation is then a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, so the game has
three such equilibria, (A,A), (B,B), and (C,C). The (B,B) and (C,C) equilibria
are efficient, while (A,A) is dominated when X ≤ 6. Note that the game
with strategies B and C only is a battle of the sexes game. There is also
a mixed equilibrium where players randomize over strategies B and C.
Here each player chooses his or her preferred allocation with probability
7/13 ≈ 0.54, and the expected payoff to each player in this equilibrium
is 42/13 ≈ 3.23.5 It follows that when X exceeds 3.23, the equal earnings
equilibrium Pareto dominates the mixed equilibrium.
5There is another mixed equilibrium where players randomize over all three alloca-
tions; here each player chooses A with probability 42/(13X + 42) and the least preferred
unequal allocation with probability 7X/(13X + 42). Each player’s expected payoff in
this equilibrium is strictly below the one in the equilibrium where players mix over B
and C. There are also mixed equilibria with randomization over the equal and one of
the unequal outcomes. For example, if players mix over A and B, then Player 1 chooses
the equal allocation with probability 6/(6 + X) and Player 2 chooses the equal allocation
with probability 7/(7 + X). Note that all the mixed equilibria involving the equal allo-
cation have the feature that the lower the earnings X in the equal outcome are, the more




The Two-Allocation Game is identical to the Three-Allocation Game, ex-
cept that there are only two feasible allocations:
• £X for Player 1 and £X for Player 2
• £6 for Player 1 and £7 for Player 2.
Denoting these strategies as A and B, and again letting Player 1 (2) be Row
(Column) player, the strategic form is shown in Table 2.6
A B
A X, X 0,0
B 0,0 6,7
Table 2: Strategic form for the Two-Allocation Game.
As before, when X > 0 both (A,A) and (B,B) are equilibria. If X ≤ 6 only
(B,B) equilibrium is efficient. If 6 < X < 7, both equilibria are efficient.
The Two-Allocation Game differs by design from the Three-Allocation
Game in that there is no longer a coordination problem in selecting among
efficient and unequal earnings equilibria.7
It follows that if, for a given X, behavior in the Three and Two Allo-
cation Game differs significantly, the difference can be attributed to the
absence or presence of such a coordination problem. Intuitively, in the
Three-Allocation Game a player may decide to choose the equal allocation
(and hope that the other person reasons the same way) because he or she
fears that they may otherwise fail to coordinate on one of the two efficient
6If we return to the examples given earlier, the deceased person’s will now specifies
that the siblings can only decide between a certain pre-specified division of the paint-
ings, or selling both and sharing the proceeds. In the household setting, one person is
prevented from working full-time in the labor market.
7A referee pointed out that a more fundamental difference is that the number of strate-
gies differ. We agree that this could affect behavior per se, for example by making it more
or less likely that a player will use a heuristic or rule of thumb. This could be investigated
in future work.
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equilibria. The person has no reason to fear this in the Two-Allocation
Game. If subjects prefer to settle on an efficient but unequal outcome in-
stead of an equal and dominated one, then we would expect more subjects
to choose an unequal allocation in the Two than in the Three-Allocation
game since it is much easier for them to settle on an efficient allocation in
the former than in the latter game.
4 Experimental Logistics
The experiments were conducted at the Centre for Behavioural and Ex-
perimental Social Science, at University of East Anglia (Norwich, United
Kingdom). In total 380 subjects took part over 21 sessions, with an average
of 18 subjects in each session. Each subject took part in only one session,
was presented with only one game, and made only one decision. Thus
each subject’s choice is an independent observation.
Subjects received a hardcopy of the instructions (see Appendix) which
were read out by the experimenter. The instructions explained that each
subject had been matched in a pair as either Player 1 or 2, that each subject
had to choose an allocation individually, and that they would only earn
money if they chose the same allocation.8
After the instructions had been read out, any questions were answered.
Subjects then made their decisions, received their earnings from the game
(including a £2 show up fee), and left the lab. As previously mentioned,
each subject encountered and made a decision in one game only. A typical
session lasted 20 minutes.
5 Experimental Treatments
We collected data for games with five different values of X, and that had
either one or two efficient and unequal equilibria (two versus three alloca-
tions). These treatment variables were varied independently in a between
8Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned a seat number (player ID). This player
ID determined the role (1 or 2). Subjects were then informed that they would be matched
with another participant in the other role. The experimenters had already determined
which Player 1s and 2s would be matched, but the participants did not know this. Thus,
although the matching procedure was deterministic and decided a priori, it was from the
participants’ point of view equivalent to a random matching procedure.
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subjects design, so there are ten treatments. The parameter X (measured
in British pounds) took one of the following values: 6.5, 6, 5, 4, and 3.9
We ran some additional treatments, in order to assess the robustness of
the results from the main treatments.
First, in order to assess the effects of a higher payoff inequality in the ef-
ficient equilibria we collected data for a Three-Allocation Game with X=5
and where the unequal outcomes offer £6 to one and £9 to the other player,
as opposed to £6 and £7 used in the main treatment. We recruited 54 sub-
jects for this game. We also collected data for a Two-Allocation Game with
allocations (5,5) and (6,9). 28 subjects took part in this treatment.
Second, in the instructions the equal earnings allocation was always
listed at the top (see Appendix). A potential concern is that this could
have made the equal allocation more salient, compared to the case where
this allocation appeared at, for example, the bottom of the list. In order to
measure any order effects we designed two additional treatments, using
the X=5 Three-Allocation Games: In the ”Equal in Middle” condition the
allocations are listed as (from top to bottom) 67, 55, and 76; In the ”Equal
at Bottom” condition, the allocations appear in the order 67, 76, and 55.
We recruited 16 subjects for the first, and 20 for the second treatment.
Table 3 shows all treatments and the number of subjects that took part




Table 4 shows the data for Three-Allocation Games. For each treatment
(columns), and each allocation (rows) we report the percentage of Player 1
and Player 2 subjects who chose that allocation. The expected coordination
rate (ECR) is the probability, given the observed behavior, that there is
coordination on any of the three allocations.10
When the equal allocation is efficient (X=6.5), everyone coordinates on
it, as has been observed in all the other experiments described in the In-
troduction. The same is true when equality is weakly dominated (X=6).
9At the time of the experiment, £1 equalled $1.60 or €1.20.
10For example, in the game X = 4, ECR = .529× .471 + .294× .353 + .176× .176.
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Value of X
6.5 6 5 4 3
Main Games
Three Allocations 16 18 36 34 34
Two Allocations 14 40 38 18 14
Robustness Checks
Three Allocations, High Payoff
Asymmetry
– – 54 – –
Two Allocations, High Payoff
Asymmetry
– – 28 – –
Order Effect Checks
Three Allocations, Equal in
Middle
– – 16 – –
Three Allocations, Equal at
Bottom
– – 20 – –
Table 3: Treatments and subject numbers.
When X=5, the (5,5) equilibrium is strictly Pareto dominated by each of the
two other outcomes, but is chosen by more than three quarters of Player
1 and 2 subjects. When equality is even less efficient (X=4), it remains the
modal choice, and about half of Player 1 and 2s continue to choose it. Fi-
nally, when equality offers only three pounds (X=3), the equal allocation
remains the modal choice for Player 1s, and almost a third of Player 2s
choose it.
6.2 Two-Allocation Games
The data for Two-Allocation Games are shown in Table 5. When X=6.5,
almost everyone chooses the equal allocation. When X=6, such that the
equal outcome is weakly Pareto-dominated, a majority (60%) of subjects
now avoid the equal allocation and instead choose (6,7), whereas everyone
chose the equal allocation in the Three-Allocation Game. When X=5 an
even larger majority of subjects avoid the equal allocation, whereas the
opposite was observed in the Three-Allocation Game. When X=4 only
one subject chooses the equal allocation, while about half chose it in the
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X=6.5 X=6 X=5 X=4 X=3
Allocation
(X,X)
100%,100% 100%,100% 77.8%,77.8% 52.9%,47.1% 47.1%,29.4%
Allocation
(6,7)
0%,0% 0%,0% 5.6%,22.2% 29.4%,35.3% 35.3%,29.4%
Allocation
(7,6)
0%,0% 0%,0% 16.7%,0% 17.6%,17.6% 17.6%,41.2%
ECR 100% 100% 61.7% 38.4% 31.5%
(N,N) 8,8 9,9 18,18 17,17 17,17
Table 4: Data for Three-Allocation Games. Columns are treatments, and
rows allocations. Each cell contains the percentages of Player 1 and 2 sub-
jects choosing the allocation. ECR: Expected coordination rate; N: Number
of subjects in the role of Player 1 and 2.
Three-Allocation Game. Finally, when X=3, almost everyone chooses the
unequal and efficient allocation.
6.3 Comparing Three and Two-Allocation Games
For each X we compare the proportions of subjects who choose the equal
allocation in the Three and Two-Allocation Games. We find that the dif-
ference is strongly significant (p < .0001 for X = 6, 5, 4 and p = .0395 for
X = 3, Fisher’s Exact Test, two-sided).
Since the only difference between the games is whether or not there
is a coordination problem in selecting an efficient unequal earnings equi-
librium, these findings support a hypothesis that subjects in the Three-
Allocation Games seek to coordinate on an equal allocation primarily be-
cause they wish to avoid the risk of coordination failure in selecting an
efficient equilibrium.
6.4 High Payoff Asymmetry Treatments
Consider now the two High Payoff Asymmetry treatments. In the Three-
Allocation Game we observe that 19 (70%) Player 1s choose allocation
(5,5), 2 (7%) choose allocation (6,9), and 6 (23%) choose allocation (9,6).
For Player 2 the numbers are 19 (70%), 1 (4%), and 7 (26%), respectively.
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X = 6.5 X=6 X=5 X=4 X=3
Allocation
(X,X)
86%,86% 40%,40% 31.6%,15.8% 0%,11.1% 14%,0%
Allocation
(6,7)
14%,14% 60%,60% 68.4%,84.2% 100%,88.9% 86%,100%
ECR 77% 52% 62.6% 88.9% 86%
(N,N) 7,7 20,20 19,19 9,9 7,7
Table 5: Data for Two-Allocation Games. Each cell contains the percent-
ages of Player 1 and 2 subjects choosing the allocation. ECR: Expected
coordination rate; N: Number of subjects in the role of Player 1 and 2.
The expected coordination rate is 56%. The difference between the num-
ber of players choosing the equal outcome in each game is not statistically
significantly different (Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .47, two-sided).
In the Two-Allocation Game we observe that 2 (14%) of Player 1s choose
allocation (5,5) and 12 (86%) choose allocation (6,9). The Player 2 frequen-
cies are the same. The expected coordination rate is 76%. More players
thus choose the efficient outcome when payoff inequality is 6–9 than when
it is 6–7. However, the difference between the number of players choosing
the equal outcome in each game is not statistically significantly different
(Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .53, two-sided). These findings suggest that the
findings are robust to increases in the payoff inequality in the efficient out-
comes.
6.5 Order Effect Treatments
We next consider if there are order effects. In the Equal in Middle condi-
tion, we observe that 5 (62.5%) Player 1s choose allocation (5,5), 3 (37.5%)
chose allocation (6,7), and none chose allocation (7,6). The corresponding
Player 2 frequencies are 5 (62.5%), 2 (25%), and 1 (12.5%).
In the Equal at Bottom condition, 8 (80%) Player 1s choose allocation
(5,5), 1 (10%) chose allocation (6,7), and 1 (10%) choose allocation (7,6).
The Player 2 frequencies are 9 (90%), 1 (10%), and 0 (0%).
A majority of players thus chose the equal allocation regardless of the
order with which the options were listed. If we compare the total num-
ber of players choosing the equal allocation, we find that there are no
12
statistically significant differences between the three choice distributions
(a Fisher’s Exact Test comparing the main data with the data for Middle
gives p = 0.31, two-sided, a comparison between the main data and the
data for Bottom gives p = .72, and a comparison between Middle and
Bottom gives p = 0.15). Thus we find no evidence of an order effect.
7 Connections to Theory
7.1 Focal Point Reasoning
In the Three-Allocation Game with X ≤ 6, (X, X) is dominated. This prop-
erty should make it unattractive per se. Nevertheless, (X, X) stands out
because it is the unique equal outcome, and the players have no way of
selecting (6,7) or (7,6) without a risk of coordination failure. This is due
to the absence of salient player labels or any other contextual aspect that
could help the players to distinguish between the two asymmetric out-
comes. Thus, if X is not too low, both players can (as shown in Section 3.1)
expect to earn more money if they choose X than if they try to coordinate
on (6,7) or (7,6).
This focal point based reasoning (see for example Schelling (1960), Craw-
ford et al. (2008), Isoni et al. (2013)), Bardsley et al. (2010), Casajus (2000),
Janssen (2001), and Sugden and Zamarron (2006)) predicts that the sub-
jects choose (X, X) in the Three-Allocation Game when X is sufficiently
large, and that no one will choose a dominated (X, X) outcome in the
Two-Allocation Game, since the latter game does not present subjects with
the problem of selecting between two unequal outcomes. More precisely,
consider for the Three-Allocation Game the ‘reduced’ two-strategy game
where each player either chooses the (X, X) equilibrium or mixes over the
(6,7) or (7,6) outcomes. When X is sufficiently large (X ≥ 3.23, cf. Section
3.1), (X, X) is the payoff dominant (Harsanyi and Selten (1988)) equilib-
rium of this game. The prediction for the Three-Allocation Game is there-
fore that the experimental subjects select the mixed equilibrium for X ≤ 3
and choose (X, X) for X ≥ 4. Of course, since subjects were not allowed
to submit mixed strategies we cannot observe this. A weaker prediction
is that the overall attraction of the equal earnings equilibrium should in-
crease in X, and this is indeed what the data show. When X ≤ 6 subjects
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are predicted to never choose (X, X) in the Two-Allocation Game.11 The
data are qualitatively consistent with these predictions.12
7.2 Other–Regarding Preferences
The equal compromise option can be attractive not only because it offers
players a way to avoid a costly coordination failure, but also because play-
ers may be inequity averse, as modelled in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Note however that a preference for equality
would make the compromise outcome relatively more attractive in both
the two and the three allocation game, so inequity aversion cannot by it-
self explain the differential salience of the compromise option in the two
and three allocation games.
7.3 Level-k Modelling
We can also consider to what extent a level-k model (see e.g. Crawford
et al. (2013), Crawford et al. (2008), Nagel (1995), and Stahl and Wilson
(1995)) can explain our findings from Three-Allocation Games.13 Let X ≤
6. Suppose first, as is often assumed (see Crawford et al. (2013)), that the
Level Zero (L0) player randomizes uniformly over the three allocations,
(X,X), (6,7), and (7,6). This specification cannot explain why fewer sub-
jects choose (X, X) when X decreases.14 For the level-k model to orga-
nize the data it is necessary that Level Zero chooses (X, X) with a suffi-
11When 6 < X < 7 both equilibria are efficient. In this case the most salient equilibrium
can be taken to the be the one offering equal earnings. Thus the prediction is that all (no)
subjects choose (X, X) for X > 6 (X ≤ 6).
12Our finding that a hypothesis based on focal point based reasoning organizes the
data well can also be seen as supporting a related hypothesis, known as team reasoning
– see Bardsley et al. (2010) and Faillo et al. (2015).
13A referee pointed out that any test of a level-k model ultimately requires collecting
data on subjects’ beliefs about the opponent’s choice, and we do not have such evidence.
14To see this, observe that a Player 1 Level 1 (L1) type then responds to L0 by choosing
(7,6), and Player 2 L1 chooses (6,7). Player 1 L2 consequently chooses (6,7) and Player
2 L2 chooses (7,6). Thus only L0s choose (X, X), and since this proportion is assumed
constant, the model cannot explain the change in the choice frequency of (X, X)). It is
also clear that an assumption that L0 chooses its preferred outcome, (7,6) when Player 1
and (6,7) when Player 2, does not organize the data for the Three Allocation Game, since
L1s and L2s would then never choose outcome (X, X).
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ciently large probability that is increasing in the value of X, even though
the (X, X) outcome is strictly dominated. This in turn suggests that the
L0 type is either influenced by some preference for equality, or must find
it salient to choose (X, X) because of this outcome’s uniqueness and con-
spicuousness. Such a L0 specification clearly differs from those normally
assumed (see Crawford et al. (2013) and Hargreaves-Heap et al. (2014)).
8 Conclusion
When a group of subjects need to coordinate their behavior in order to
avoid conflict, how focal is a compromise outcome that offers equal but
dominated earnings? We experimentally observe that a dominated equal
outcome is highly salient as long its payoffs are not too low. We also ob-
serve, however, that the salience of a dominated equal outcome signifi-
cantly depends on whether subjects face a coordination problem in select-
ing among efficient equilibria or not. If there is only a single efficient and
unequal earnings equilibrium, then subjects are much less likely to settle
on an equal and dominated equilibrium. This suggests that the salience of
equality in coordination situations is mainly due to the fact that its unique-
ness and conspicuousness (Schelling (1960)) offers players a way to reduce
the strategic uncertainty and avoid a costly coordination failure.
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Appendix: Instructions
This Appendix shows the instructions used for the Three-Allocation Game with
X=5. The instructions for the corresponding Two-Allocation Game were identi-
cal, except that there were only two allocations (i.e., the line describing allocation
(7,6) had been removed).
Your ID number:
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Please do not communi-
cate with any other participant. You will be matched with one of the other
participants. The two of you will play anonymously. That is, no one will
learn who they are matched with.
One of you will be Player 1, and the other will be Player 2. If your ID
number is odd (1,3,5 etc), you are Player 1. If it is even (2,4,6 etc), you are
Player 2. In your case:
Your ID is an number, so you are Player , and the participant
you are matched with is Player .
Your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
In addition, you receive £2 for taking part in the experiment.
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What must Player 1 and 2 do?
Each person chooses one of the following three allocations of money
between Player 1 and 2:
• £5 for Player 1 and £5 for Player 2
• £6 for Player 1 and £7 for Player 2
• £7 for Player 1 and £6 for Player 2
How to earn money:
If both persons choose the same allocation, then each person gets the
money that the chosen allocation says he or she should get. But if they
choose different allocations, each person gets no money (= £0). It is there-
fore in the interest of both persons to choose the same allocation.
Are there any questions?
Your decision:
Please now think carefully about this, and then make your decision by
circling or underlining the allocation you choose.
When you are done, please turn this sheet face down and wait for one
of the experimenters to come and collect it.
We then calculate your money earnings, and you will receive them
shortly afterwards. Thank you for participating in this experiment.
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